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4
The JTPA Incentive System
Implementing Performance 
Measurement and Funding 
Pascal Courty
Gerald Marschke
This chapter outlines the specifi cs of JTPA’s performance incen-
tives, which provide necessary background information for subsequent 
chapters in this monograph. It also speaks generally to the challenges 
that must be met in formulating performance measures and incentives 
anywhere in government.1 In particular, we argue that the decisions 
about what should be measured, and how, when, and by whom it should 
be measured, make a critical difference for the success of incentive-
backed performance measurement. 
The JTPA organization was conceived in the spirit of New Federal-
ism. Proponents of New Federalism have argued that more decentralized 
decision making leads to “laboratories of the states” that foster innova-
tion and creativity and hence, in the end, superior policies. In JTPA, 
states indeed used their discretion to produce a wide variety of perfor-
mance measurement and incentive structures. The federal government 
retained control over some important aspects of the incentive system. 
The discretion left to the states, however, was important for determin-
ing the character of performance measurement and the incentives.
By providing an analytical description of performance measure-
ment in JTPA, this chapter complements the institutional literature on 
the JTPA bureaucracy (Barnow 1992; Svorny 1996). Although this 
literature provides a good understanding of how JTPA’s performance 
incentives worked at the federal level, it has little to say about its imple-
mentation at the state level. By offering a more complete description of 
JTPA performance incentives, this chapter lays the foundation for under-
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standing how the JTPA incentive system determined bureau-cratic behavior 
and program outcomes. Previous studies of the impact of JTPA’s perfor-
mance incentive scheme on bureaucratic behavior (Anderson, Burkhauser, 
and Raymond 1993; Courty and Marschke 2004; Heckman, Smith, and 
Taber 1996; and Marschke 2002) have used only the federal guidelines, 
which provide an incomplete and possibly misleading representation of 
the true incentive systems.2 Along with others (see, e.g., Wholey 1999, 
p. 305), we believe that such case studies of operational performance 
measurement systems are important inputs into developing theories to 
understand and recommendations to improve performance measure-
ment in the public sector.
We limit our description to the state incentive and performance 
measurement policies for the years 1987–1989 for a sample of 16 states 
(identifi ed in Table 4.1).3 In describing JTPA’s performance-based in-
centive system, we address three questions. First, what was the nature 
of the training center’s incentive? Or, how much was at stake? Sec-
ond, which dimension of performance did JTPA reward? That is, what 
mattered? According to the act, Congress intended the performance 
incentives to measure the training centers’ success in developing par-
ticipants’ labor-market specifi c human capital (U.S. Congress 1982, 
Section 106[a]). Because direct measures of human-capital value-added 
are unavailable, the program’s federal overseers have resorted to prox-
ies of value-added. At the heart of the JTPA incentive system is a set of 
performance measures based on the labor market outcomes of enrollees 
at or shortly after training. We describe these performance measures. 
Third, what is the relationship between performance and awards? In 
JTPA, states determined awards in three steps. First, they standardized 
the performance outcomes to make them comparable across training 
centers. States rewarded training centers not for the absolute level of 
performance but for their performance in excess of a numerical thresh-
old, or performance standard. The performance standard depended on 
factors that were specifi c to each training center and outside the centers’ 
control. The performance standards were intended to establish reason-
able counterfactual levels of performance that one would expect given 
the environment in which the training center operated. The second step 
was to establish the training center’s eligibility for an award. Train-
ing centers were usually eligible only if they exceeded the standards 
associated with all or a defi ned subset of the performance measures. 
chapter4.indd   66 4/27/2011   9:43:32 AM
The JTPA Incentive System   67
Finally, the states formulated award functions that translated training 
centers’ excess performances into budgetary awards. The sensitivity of 
the award to excess performance determined the strength of the incen-
tive and varied across states and over time.
The chapter is organized as follows. The fi rst section investigates 
the bureaucrats’ motivations for seeking awards. The second section 
explains the JTPA performance measures and also how performance 
outcomes across the population of training centers were adjusted to 
level the playing fi eld. The third section describes the incentive award, 
and the last section concludes and summarizes our main fi ndings. 
AWARDS AND BUREAUCRATIC PREFERENCES
The JTPA incentive system takes the form of increases in training 
centers’ training budgets. We start by describing the sizes of these in-
creases. By focusing solely on the absolute award amounts, however, 
one risks overlooking potentially important infl uences of performance 
awards on bureaucratic behavior and program outcomes. These non-
fi nancial reasons are reviewed next. 
Award Size
The act required that states allocate about 7 percent of their total 
JTPA training budget to their incentive programs.4 States then decided 
how to allocate this sum among the three categories of expenditures: 1) 
awards for successful training centers, 2) administration of the incen-
tive programs, and 3) “technical assistance” for unsuccessful training 
centers. JTPA mandated that the state set aside funds for technical assis-
tance, but left the amount set aside up to the state. Technical assistance 
provided resources to improve managerial performance to training cen-
ters that failed to meet performance standards.
While the act intended that the training centers use the awards pri-
marily for training, awards could also be used for staff bonuses and 
payroll increases. A training center was required to spend at least 70 
percent of the award on training activities, leaving 30 percent, at most, 
for staff compensation. By comparison, training centers were permitted 
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Table 4.1  State Funding of the JTPA Incentive Program States of the National JTPA Study, 1987–1989




of 6 % funds
Percentage of 
award funds 





of 6 % funds
Percentage of 
award funds 





of 6 % funds
Percentage of 
award funds 
allocated to federal 
performance 
standards
CA 85 100 85 88 85 88
CO 95 100 85 100 85 100
FL — — — — — —
GA 75 100 75 90 75 90
IA 75 99 75 99 75 99
IL 75 100 75 100 75 100
IN 93 40 92 60 78 60
MN 85 50 85 50 85 50
MOa 100 100 100 100 100 100
MS 100 70 98 70 98 70
MTa 66 100 66 100 66 100
NE 85 60 85 60 85 60
NJ 80 33 80 33 80 33
OH 80 100 80 60 70 60
RI 75 100 75 100 75 100
TX 76 90 77 90 81 80
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NOTE: JTPA allowed each state to use up to 6 percent of its JTPA appropriation for direct cash payments to job training centers for per-
formance on federal and state performance measures. The fi rst column for each year lists the fraction of the 6 percent that was set aside 
for the award fund. This fraction represents the maximum amount that would be rewarded to training centers for performance relative 
to federal and state standards. The second column for each year represents the fraction of the award fund that is set aside for federal 
performance standards alone. — = data not available.
 aThe 1987 values for Missouri and Montana in the fi rst column are taken from the NCEP-SRI survey, which interviewed training center 
personnel in 1986 concerning the program year 1986. They are not calculated from training center policy documents.
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to spend no more than 15 percent out of budgetary funds on payroll. 
The higher cap for payroll expenses alone may have motivated training 
centers to pursue awards.
Table 4.1 shows the share of the incentive fund set aside for the 
award for a sample of 16 states in the years 1987–1989. We collected 
data on these 16 states because they contained the 16 training agen-
cies that participated in the late 1980s USDOL-commissioned National 
JTPA Study (NJS). The NJS was an important experimental study in-
volving approximately 20,000 enrollees that was designed to measure 
the impact of job training in JTPA on participants’ earnings and em-
ployment prospects. The analyses contained in Chapters 5, 6, and 9 
are at least in part based on the NJS data. The second, fourth, and sixth 
columns show the award size as a percentage of the 7 percent incentive 
fund for 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. Although states varied in 
the portion set aside for awards, as Table 4.1 shows, most states made 
available a majority of the incentive fund to training centers as potential 
awards. Montana set aside the smallest share—66 percent of the incen-
tive fund—while Missouri and Mississippi (in 1987) set aside the entire 
fund to be paid out as an incentive award. While the portion set aside 
varied signifi cantly across states, it was stable over the 1987–1989 pe-
riod. For example, between 1987 and 1989, Illinois devoted 75 percent 
of its 7 percent fund to the award fund. It reserved the other 25 percent 
for technical assistance. Only in Indiana did a signifi cant change take 
place. Between 1987 and 1989, Indiana lowered the portion set aside 
for the award from 93 percent of the incentive allocation to 78 percent. 
The other states devoted a constant (or nearly constant) share of the 
incentive funds to awards.
In some states, not all of the funds that the state made available 
for awards were paid out. Not all funds were awarded because many 
training centers did not perform well enough to meet the states’ award 
eligibility requirements. Nevertheless, as Table 4.2 shows, the amounts 
paid out were substantial. Table 4.2 shows the actual award amounts 
disbursed as a fraction of the training center’s budget for a sample of 
448 training centers in program year 1987. The average disbursement 
was equivalent to 7 percent of the training center’s budget.5 The high-
est disbursements were equivalent to 60 percent of the training center’s 
budget. Rewards this large, however, were not possible in all states.
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We expect that if incentives matter, the intensity of the behavioral 
responses to the incentives should depend on the size of the award. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the award amounts available varied sig-
nifi cantly by state. Everything else equal, we might expect that JTPA 
incentives produced greater responses among training centers in Mis-
souri than Montana where the award disbursement was the greatest 
(i.e., 100 percent of the award fund). In addition, the kind of behavioral 
response we observe would likely have depended upon how states di-
vided award money between state and federal measures of performance. 
The division matters because state and federal performance measures 
stressed different aspects of training center output. 
Why Should Training Centers Care about Awards? 
As a rough approximation, the awards might have increased sala-
ries by as much as 15 percent.6 This fi gure corresponds to the purely 
fi nancial part of the incentive. This by itself represents a substantial 
increase even compared with private sector bonuses. There is, however, 
little evidence that training center administrators paid out such a large 
share of the award as salary bonuses.7 Why, then, should bureaucrats 
care about the awards? 
There are at least three reasons why a training center may wish 
to increase its budget. First, Niskanen (1971) and others argue that 
everything the bureaucratic manager desires (salary, staff, power, pro-
fessional reputation, and perquisites) derives from the bureau’s budget. 
Table 4.2  Size of Incentive Award
Allocation ($) Incentive award ($)
Fraction of training
center’s budget
Mean 2,326,191.42 119,663.79 0.07
(Std. dev.) (3,043,936.68) (145,751.12) (0.07)
First quartile 1,003,308.50 33,000.00 0.03
Median 1,627,151.50 93,550.00 0.06
Third quartile 2,398,462.00 160,534.00 0.09
Maximum 29,408,455.00 1,407,853.00 0.57
Number of obs. 448 385 385
NOTE: Data are from the National Commission for Employment Policy and SRI, Inc. 
(see their description in Dickinson et al. [1988]).
chapter4.indd   71 4/27/2011   9:43:32 AM
72   Courty and Marschke
Because of their training and the orthodoxy of the social work pro-
fession, welfare bureaucrats—like the ones in JTPA—may behave as 
selfl ess advocates for their clients (Lipsky 1980). Nevertheless, even as 
client advocates, JTPA bureaucrats would desire extra award funds to 
expand their clients’ training resources.
Second, performance levels and the awards they represent might 
have been used by local elected offi cials for political gain. The act gave 
local elected offi cials—often these are city mayors—some authority 
over the operation of training centers. The administrative headquarters 
of training centers were frequently situated in these elected offi cials’ 
offi ces. These elected offi cials often touted performance awards as mea-
sures of their administration’s success in the local fi ght against poverty.
Third, bureaucrats might have sought performance awards for 
the professional recognition they convey. Bureaucrats faced no other 
objectives—and the public and bureaucratic superiors have no other 
evaluation criteria—as precisely defi ned, quantifi able, and available as 
these performance measures. Tirole (1994, p. 7) argues that govern-
ment bureaucrats might be “concerned by the effect of their current 
performance not so much on their monetary reward, but rather on their 
reputation or image in view of future promotions, job prospects in the 
private and public sectors.”8 Moreover, by performing well compared 
to the standards, bureaucrats could protect themselves against attack 
from outside critics and political enemies.
As a fi nal point, note that because awards were based on group 
performance, individual bureaucrats had an incentive to free-ride on the 
effort of colleagues. Free-riding may have muted the infl uence of incen-
tives at the level of caseworkers. Ultimately, the issue of the infl uence 
of budget-based awards and the signifi cance of the free-riding problem 
must be resolved empirically. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
The act directed the USDOL to formulate measures of performance 
that captured the gains produced in the employment and earnings of 
participants and the reductions in their reliance on welfare programs 
(Chapter 2). Reliable measures of earnings and employment impacts of 
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job training, however, were prohibitively costly to obtain, and instead, 
the USDOL issued measures that assessed the effectiveness of job train-
ing through the labor market outcomes of enrollees at training end. 
JTPA required states to use the USDOL’s performance measures in 
constructing their incentive system. Nevertheless, the USDOL permit-
ted states to impose additional performance measures, and many states 
did. Whereas the federally designed performance measures were con-
cerned with labor market outcomes, state measures (described below) 
tended to focus on inputs. While many states developed their own mea-
sures, they typically devoted a disproportionately small share of the 
award to them, leaving the bulk of the award for the federally designed 
measures.
The following section discusses the federal and state-designed mea-
sures and how states divided their awards between them. In addition, 
this section discusses the possible consequences of the construction 
of these measures for JTPA training practices. Over time, state and 
federal authorities replaced or redefi ned those performance measures 
whose effects were possibly counterproductive. We also discuss these 
modifi cations.
Federal Performance Measures
Table 4.3 defi nes the federal performance measures in place during 
the period 1987–1989. For the adult portion of the program, the sys-
tem’s performance measures were employment rate at termination, the 
average wage at termination, the cost per employment, the employment 
rate at 90 days after termination—i.e., at follow-up, the average weeks 
worked at follow-up, and the average weekly earnings at follow-up. For 
the youth portion of the program, the system’s performance measures 
were the employment rate at termination, the cost per employment, the 
positive termination rate, and the employability enhancement rate. The 
youth employment rate at termination and youth cost per employment 
were defi ned as for adults. Youth positive termination rate and youth 
employability enhancement rate evaluated the acquisition of certain 
kinds of general or labor market skills, such as the completion of a ma-
jor level of education, or completion of a GED certifi cation (see Table 
4.3, especially the last part of the note).
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Table 4.3  National JTPA Performance Measures in Effect in Years 1987–1989
Performance measure Defi nition
Adult performance measures
Employment rate at termination Fraction of terminees employed at termination
Welfare employment rate at 
termination
Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 
termination
Average wage at termination Average wage at termination for terminees who were employed at termination
Cost per employment Training center’s year’s expenditures on adults divided by the number of adults 
employed at termination
Employment rate at follow-up Fraction of terminees who were employed at 13 weeks after termination
Welfare employment rate at 
follow-up
Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 
13 weeks after termination
Average weekly earnings at 
follow-up
Average weekly wage of terminees who were employed 13 weeks after termination
Average weeks worked by 
follow-up
Average number of weeks worked by terminees in 13 weeks following termination
Youth performance measures
Youth employment rate at 
termination
Fraction of youth terminees employed at termination
Youth employability 
enhancement rate
Fraction of youth terminees who obtained employment competencies (see note below)
Youth positive termination rate Fraction of youth terminees who were “positively terminated” (see note below)
Youth cost per employment Training center’s year’s expenditures on youths divided by the number of youths 
positively terminated
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NOTE: The date of termination is the date the enrollee offi cially exits training. A terminee is an enrollee after he has offi cially exited 
training. All measures are calculated over the year’s terminee population. Therefore, the average follow-up weekly earnings for 1987 
was calculated using earnings at follow-up for the terminees who terminated in 1987, even if their follow-up period extended into 1988. 
Likewise, persons who terminated in 1986 were not included in the 1987 measure, even if their follow-up period extended into 1987. 
A positive termination is entering unsubsidized employment, attaining youth employment “competencies” (through coursework, train-
ing and/or tests in work maturity, basic education, or job-specifi c skills), entering non-JTPA training, returning to school full time, or 
completing a major level of education.
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All federal performance measures for adult participants had three 
characteristics in common. All performance measures were 1) year-end 
summaries of yearly cumulated performance, 2) based on aspects of the 
enrollee’s labor market status on the date the enrollee offi cially termi-
nated the program or at three months after termination, and 3) averages 
of outcomes over the population of the year’s terminees (not partici-
pants). Thus, training centers did not face a piece rate in the sense that 
training centers received compensation per unit of output: e.g., per en-
rollee employed, or per dollar increase in an enrollee’s earnings ability. 
Instead, training centers received awards for achieving high average la-
bor market outcomes. For example, the employment rate at termination 
for the fi scal year 1987 was defi ned as the fraction of persons termi-
nated between July 1, 1987, and June 30, 1988, who were employed on 
their termination date.9 Awards were thus independent of the number of 
persons who obtained high outcomes. 
The use of performance measures varied across states. In 1987, the 
USDOL required states to base incentives on seven termination-based 
measures: the adult employment rate at termination, adult welfare em-
ployment rate at termination, adult cost per employment, average wage 
at termination, youth employment rate at termination, youth positive 
termination rate, and youth cost per employment. In 1988–1989, the 
USDOL extended the list of measures to the 12 described in Table 4.3 
and required states to choose any 8 or more of these 12 measures. 
The years 1988 and 1989 marked the beginning of the phaseout of 
termination-based performance measures and the cost measure.10 After 
1992, the USDOL prohibited the states from using any cost measures 
of performance. Moreover, after 1992, all performance measures based 
on measures of output became follow-up measures.11
Performance measures based on labor market outcomes may have 
infl uenced training center behavior in several ways. First, because they 
measure aspects of an enrollee’s employment state and not the impact 
of job training, they may have led training centers to select enrollees 
most able to achieve high levels of employment at high wages, instead 
of the enrollees most likely to benefi t from the program. This behavior 
has been called cream skimming (see Chapters 6 and 9). 
Second, the performance measures may have encouraged train-
ing centers to offer “quick fi xes,” that is, employment-oriented job 
search or on-the-job training services. These services, rather than more 
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intensive kinds that result in greater skill development, would more 
frequently lead to employment on the measurement date, whether or 
not the employment match was suitable and likely to last beyond the 
end of training. The reason why quick fi xes may have been preferred 
is because the employment and wage measures focused on labor mar-
ket success at a point in time rather than over a period of time. Cream 
skimming is an example of dysfunctional behavior that results when 
the performance measures are not well-aligned with the goals of the 
organization. If quick fi xes generate smaller welfare gains per dollar 
spent than more intensive services they also constitute dysfunctional 
behavior (see Bloom et al. [1997] for evidence on the relative effective-
ness of different training types in JTPA). See Blau (1955) for an early 
discussion of unintended responses to performance measures.
Third, because these measures were based on averages instead of 
aggregate outcomes, training centers had no incentive to spend their 
entire budget. Actually, the optimal training strategy from a pure perfor-
mance point of view was to enroll only the most promising applicant. 
More generally, enrolling a smaller than effi cient population would 
typically be an optimal strategy in areas where able applicants were 
scarce. In these areas, rather than enroll less able enrollees who lower 
per capita scores, training centers would prefer to leave some of their 
budget unspent. 
Fourth, the role of the cost measure was ambiguous. The cost mea-
sure was defi ned as the total expenditure divided by the number of 
persons employed at training end. Holding spending constant, the cost 
measure becomes an incentive to produce as many employed terminees 
as possible. Bureaucrats could produce greater numbers of employed 
terminees either by increasing their employment rates at termination or 
by enrolling more applicants (holding the employment rate constant). 
Viewed in this way the cost measure would have countered the incen-
tive to serve small populations. The elimination of the cost measures in 
the last years of JTPA would have added an additional incentive to re-
duce the number of enrollees served. Training centers would enroll less 
than the effi cient number of enrollees because small enrollee popula-
tions increased the per capita spending, and greater per capita spending 
increased the per capita performance outcomes (Barnow [1992] makes 
this point).
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Federal Performance Standards
The impact of the performance measures on bureaucratic behavior 
depended critically on the threshold the bureaucrat had to meet. For ex-
ample, a training center did not receive an award for the wage measure 
if its year-end average wage outcome (the average wage at termina-
tion) failed to meet the average wage standard. Thus, the wage measure 
would produce no effect on behavior if the wage standard was set too 
high so that no amount of effort would push the wage outcome over the 
standard. Another reason why the performance standards were crucial 
was because the performance awards did not depend on absolute per-
formance but on excess performance, that is, on the difference between 
the performance outcome and the performance standard.
This subsection describes the heights of the standards and how they 
were tailored to the different environments faced by the training centers. 
The USDOL adjusted the performance standards to the local conditions 
faced by training centers in an attempt to level the playing fi eld.
For each performance measure, the numerical standard started with 
the national “departure point.” The USDOL set the departure point for 
all but the cost and wage measures at the 25th percentile of the distribu-
tion of performance in the system in the preceding two years. That is, 
75 percent of the training centers would have exceeded the performance 
standard on average. For the cost measure, good performances were 
low performances. Successful training centers had to produce an out-
come below the standard. The USDOL set the departure point for the 
cost measure at the 90th percentile. For the wage measure, the depart-
ment set the departure point at the 50th percentile.12
Training centers faced different costs of meeting these departure 
points. Costs varied because labor markets, training costs, and the 
characteristics of the eligible populations varied. Imposing uniform 
standards would have favored low-cost training centers by increasing 
their resources relative to high-cost training centers. Only in the case 
that low-cost training centers tended also to be more effi cient would 
such incentives enhance the effi ciency of the allocation of training 
resources. Believing that this probably was not the case, the USDOL 
established an adjustment model that took into account features of the 
training center’s environment that may be correlated with costs. For ex-
ample, by taking into account local unemployment measures and other 
chapter4.indd   78 4/27/2011   9:43:33 AM
The JTPA Incentive System   79
measures of the labor market, the adjustment methodology lowered the 
employment rate standard for training centers in depressed job markets, 
compared to training centers in robust job markets.
Although the USDOL allowed states some fl exibility in developing 
standards, most states used the department’s adjustment methodology.13 
All states participating in the NJS used the USDOL’s adjustment model 
during the NJS years. We describe this method here.
USDOL adjustment model
Consider an arbitrary performance measure and let Sl be the out-
come produced by training center l. The USDOL adjustment scheme 
posited that the following function generates performance outcome Sl .
(4.1)    1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ... ( ) ,l l l M Ml M lS x x x x x x                   
where x x xl l Ml1 2, ,..., are training center l’s realizations for the M factors 
chosen, x x xM1 2, ,..., , are the average realizations of these factors over 
all JTPA training centers, and εl is a site-specifi c error term. Biannually 
the USDOL estimated the coeffi cients β with the most recent two years 
of training center–level data using ordinary least squares. βm expresses 
the impact of an increase in the factor xMl , on the outcome Sl , holding 
other factors constant. The USDOL chose a different set of factors for 
each performance measure. It chose those economic factors and demo-
graphic variables based upon their availability and whether the factors 
were statistically correlated with the performance outcomes. In addi-
tion, political considerations may have played a role.14
Table 4.4 presents an example of a JTPA worksheet for adjusting 
the adult employment rate at termination in 1987. The fi rst six adjust-
ment factors in the table are enrollment population characteristics (the 
percentage of the participant population that is female, black, Hispanic, 
Asian, handicapped, and welfare recipients). The last two adjustment 
factors are measures of the local economy (unemployment rate and 
population density). Column B presents factor values for a hypotheti-
cal training center. Columns C and E present the actual national factor 
averages and the weights from the USDOL adjustment model for 1987. 
These weights are the estimated effects of each characteristic on the 
performance outcome adult employment rate at termination (estimated 
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Table 4.4  U.S. Department of Labor’s Performance Standard Adjustment Model Performance Standard: Adult
Employment Rate at Termination
A. Local factors





(B − C) E. Weights
F. Effect of
local factors
% Female 49.9 52.8 −2.9 −0.020 0.058
% Black 41.2 23.8 17.4 −0.081 −1.41
% Hispanic 30.1 7.9 22.2 −0.009 −0.20
% Asian 2.1 2.4 −0.3 −0.022 0.01
% Handicapped 9.5 9.1 0.4 −0.093 −0.04
% Welfare recipient 35.0 29.8 5.2 −0.276 −1.44
Unemployment rate 8.8 8.0 0.8 −0.623 −0.50
Population density 0.21 0.6 −0.39 0.771 −0.3
G. Total effect of local factors on performance expectations −5.77
H. National departure point 62.4
I. Model-adjusted performance level (G + H) 56.6
NOTE: Local factors listed in column A are determined by the USDOL. Percentages are of year’s participant population. Values for col-
umns C, E, and H are given by the USDOL. Values for column B are for a hypothetical training center.
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β’s from Equation 4.1). The training center’s realization of each of the 
factors is compared to the national average and the difference is multi-
plied by a weight. For example, suppose the hypothetical training center 
served 1,000 persons during 1987, of which 499 were female. Thus, its 
percentage female factor was 49.9 percent. To obtain the adjustment 
to the standard for the female participation factor, one multiplies the 
difference between the training center’s factor value and the national 
average (49.9 − 52.8 = −2.9) by the adjustment weight (−0.020). The 
adjustment weight refl ects how the enrollment of women historically 
affected the employment rate outcome. 
For the other factors, weighted differences were calculated simi-
larly. The total effect of local factors on performance expectations 
(column F)—the sum of the weighted differences—was added to the 
national departure point. The departure point (the 25th percentile value) 
for the measure was 62.4. The fi nal performance standard (56.6) is the 
sum of the departure point (62.4) and adjustment factor (−5.8). The 
state used the fi nal standard to establish whether the training center had 
met its adult employment rate target.
The USDOL intended that the bar be set to a height appropriate to 
the training center’s circumstances. Thus it included measures of the 
local unemployment rate and of local population density to capture as-
pects of the local labor market in which the training center operated. 
For example, as one can see from Table 4.4, the weight on the local 
unemployment rate measure was negative: a one-point increase in the 
local unemployment rate lowered the standard by about two-thirds of 
a point. Because training centers were small relative to the local labor 
market, the unemployment rate is an example of an infl uence on the 
performance outcome which was likely to be beyond the training cen-
ter’s control.
As Table 4.4 also makes clear, an important class of characteristics 
for which the USDOL adjusted standards was the composition of the 
enrollment pool. While the enrollment pool refl ected in part the compo-
sition of the local eligible population (an infl uence beyond the training 
center’s control), it was at least partly a choice variable. Adjusting the 
performance standard in this way may have encouraged the training 
center to enroll not only persons who would boost performance out-
comes, but also persons who would lower standards. 
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Table 4.4 also reveals that the USDOL adjustment model did not 
take into account training services as a relevant control variable, al-
though these data were available to the department. Thus, the nature of 
the adjustment procedure meant that the incentive system held training 
centers accountable for the kinds of training provided but not the kinds 
of enrollees enrolled; both choices have consequences for the effec-
tiveness and effi ciency of training. Neither did the adjustment model 
directly control for the training services available in the training centers’ 
local area. This is more surprising; by not controlling for the availabil-
ity and costs of training facing training centers, the incentive system 
implicitly favored those training centers located in markets where there 
was a competitive and effi cient training industry.15 
State Performance Measures and Standards
States were permitted to develop their own performance measures. 
While state measures played a smaller role than federal measures in 
the determination of the awards, the number of NJS states using their 
own measures increased from 10 to 13 between 1987 and 1989. The 
increase in importance of state-formulated measures was apparently a 
nationwide trend. 
In Table 4.1, the second column under each year shows the per-
centage of the total award set aside allocated to federal measures, as 
opposed to state measures. Although state-defi ned measures were com-
mon among the NJS states, they comprised a relatively small fraction of 
the award. Excluding New Jersey, the average split between federal—
or performance-based—measures and state measures was 82/18. The 
split ranged from a low of 50/50 to a full allocation of the money to the 
federal award. 
We broke down the state measures into four categories. The most 
important category of state measures comprised input or enrollment 
measures. In the mid-1980s, states became increasingly concerned that 
federal performance incentives were driving training center bureaucrats 
to enroll from the eligible population only those enrollees who were 
likely to get jobs at the end of training—i.e., who were “job ready.” 
Many states implemented a set of enrollment-based performance mea-
sures designed to encourage training centers to enroll the more diffi cult 
cases. In 1988, for example, 9 out of 16 states set up standards that com-
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pensated training centers for the number of or the rate at which persons 
in target groups were enrolled.16 These target groups varied by state 
but were typically the least successful in the labor market among the 
eligible and included high school dropouts, minority youths, Women/
Infant Nutrition program participants, and older workers. For example, 
in addition to compensating performance based on federal performance 
measures, Minnesota rewarded training centers for the fraction of en-
rollees who were receiving public aid. In these cases, compensation 
was contingent upon meeting a numerical standard, frequently based 
on the fraction of eligible persons in the local population who belonged 
to the target group. Studies of the effect of incentives on the enrollment 
decision can be further refi ned by allowing for these enrollment quotas 
to infl uence the enrollment decision.
The other categories of state measures were more idiosyncratic. 
Some states compensated training centers for the fraction of their bud-
getary allotment spent. For example, in 1987 and 1988, Mississippi paid 
a portion of its award money to training centers that spent at least 85 
percent or more of their budgets. Training centers might have left por-
tions of their budgets unspent because, as we noted above, the kinds of 
applicants who would produce high-performance outcomes may have 
been scarce. Rather than enrolling less able enrollees who lower per 
capita scores, training centers might have enrolled fewer enrollees than 
the maximum their budgets would have allowed.
Three of the 16 states sought to encourage JTPA training centers 
to coordinate their activities with other state agencies that helped the 
poor.17 In promoting these goals, states typically evaluated performance 
subjectively, without well-defi ned performance standards. Finally, 
although state performance measures usually were not based on par-
ticipant labor market outcomes, some states used their own measures 
to encourage training centers to seek longer-term employment matches 
before the USDOL began offering the follow-up measures in 1988. In 
1987, New Jersey used a separate measure for employment retention, 
similar to the federal employment rate at follow-up measure.
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THE JTPA AWARD
This section describes how states used performance outcomes and 
standards to reward training centers. In particular, we discuss the states’ 
eligibility rules that determine which training centers received awards 
and the award functions themselves. The award functions translate the 
performance of eligible training centers to award amounts. 
The states were entirely free to design the eligibility rules and the 
performance awards as they saw fi t, which led to great variation in both 
across states. In fact, no two award functions (or eligibility rules, for 
that matter) were identical. Because of space constraints, we do not 
report the exact computation rules for the awards. Instead, we defi ne 
some broad dimensions that are important from a behavioral point of 
view, to categorize the different types of award functions, illustrating 
where appropriate with specifi c details from the state incentive systems. 
Qualifying for Awards
Here we discuss the qualifying criteria for the 16 NJS states in years 
1987–1989. Some states (such as Indiana) required training centers 
to meet all standards as a prerequisite for earning any award money. 
Other states required training centers to exceed a subset of standards 
to qualify. For example, in 1987 Minnesota required training centers to 
exceed fi ve of seven performance standards to qualify for awards. Other 
states had no qualifi cation criteria. These states (such as Iowa) simply 
rewarded training centers for each performance standard exceeded.
Some qualifi cation criteria were quite complicated. For example, 
in 1987, Illinois divided the seven federal measures in place at the time 
into three groups. To qualify for an incentive grant, a training center 
had to meet both standards in the fi rst group, one of two standards in 
the second group, and one of three standards in the third group.18 In ad-
dition, the training center had to meet a slightly higher version of the 
standards for at least one measure.
The number and kind of standards a training center had to meet 
to win an award may have been an important determinant of the in-
fl uence of incentives upon behavior. States that required the training 
center to meet all standards discouraged training centers from special-
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izing in the production of certain performance outcomes at the expense 
of others. Moreover, the greater the number of performance standards 
that training centers were required to meet, the lower their likelihood of 
obtaining an award. By lowering the chances to qualify for an award, 
such qualifi cation criteria may have discouraged training centers from 
attempting to win awards.
Award Function
The award functions varied along several important dimensions. 
The three most important dimensions, discussed below, address three 
broad questions: Which performance measures mattered? How com-
petitive was the incentive system? Did excess performance cease to 
matter after some point? 
Performance measure weighting. By exercising their discretion 
over which measures they included in their awards (see Table 4.2) and 
in their construction of the eligibility criteria, states could emphasize 
some performance measures and de-emphasize others. In addition, 
states used explicit weighting schemes in the award function for the 
same purpose. Although many states weighted each measure used 
equally, some states weighted performance measures differently to em-
phasize some measures over others.
Consider, for example, New Jersey in 1987 and 1988. While a train-
ing center there had to meet its cost standards to qualify for an award, 
its cost outcomes did not fi gure into the award’s calculation. More-
over, the award calculation up-weighted the follow-up-based measures 
compared to the termination-based measures. In de-emphasizing the 
cost- and termination-based measures, New Jersey intended to encour-
age training centers to provide more intensive training and enroll more 
diffi cult-to-train enrollees (see Note 12). 
Competition among training centers. In many states (such as 
Texas), a training center’s award depended only on its own perfor-
mance. In Illinois’s scheme, the size of a successful training center’s 
award depended on the number of training centers that qualifi ed: the 
lower the number of training centers that qualifi ed, the greater the al-
location to the successful ones.
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Other examples of interdependence more closely resemble the rela-
tive performance evaluation schemes found in the incentive literature 
in economics. New Jersey is an example of a state that pitted training 
centers against one another in a form of head-to-head competition. In 
New Jersey’s tournament system, a training center received an award 
based not on an absolute level of performance but on its position in a 
ranking of its fellow training centers. 
Evaluating a training center on its relative performance may have 
stimulated competition between training centers by accentuating social 
comparisons. Another reason for relative performance evaluation is 
that it holds training centers harmless for infl uences that are beyond the 
training center’s control and that affect all training centers uniformly. 
Thus, relative performance evaluation should be most effective in states 
where training centers are homogeneous (e.g., operate in similar envi-
ronments) and if the performance standards do a poor job of controlling 
for factors that are outside the training centers’ control.19 
Marginal incentive. The marginal incentive measures the change 
in incentive award for a small change in performance. Marginal incen-
tives are constant when the award function is linear, as in a piece rate 
compensation system. However, they may depend on the level of per-
formance. When the marginal incentives vary with the level of perfor-
mance, incentives are said to be nonlinear. In JTPA, the main source 
of nonlinearity was the performance standard: in many states, train-
ing centers were paid only contingent upon achieving standards. Many 
states (such as Georgia) paid out the entire award merely for meeting 
the standards. Such states provided no pecuniary incentive to exceed 
the standards. Other states, however, compensated training centers for 
performance in excess of the standard, at least over some range of per-
formance. For example, in Illinois in 1987, a training center’s award 
increased with its performance, until its performance exceeded the stan-
dard by 40 percent. For performance in excess of 40 percent of the 
standard, the training center received no additional compensation. The 
marginal incentives for performances above 40 percent of the standard 
were zero.
As with many incentive systems based upon attaining stan-
dards, training centers may have been able to manipulate the award 
intertemporally by selectively choosing when to report good and bad 
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performances. In this way, training centers would have been able to 
increase their performance outcomes without actually increasing the ef-
fectiveness of their training. Deadline effects have been described in 
the behavior of military recruiters whose bonuses depend on recruit-
ment quotas (Asch 1990), salespersons whose commissions depend on 
achieving sales targets (Oyer 1995), and CEOs whose bonuses depend 
on performance targets linked to measures of corporate earnings (Healy 
1985). See Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997) for evidence of deadline 
effects in JTPA, and Courty and Marschke (2004) for an attempted es-
timation of the effi ciency costs of these effects.
CONCLUSION
This chapter details a description of the incentives in place under 
JTPA. The incentive awards amount to budgetary increases that training 
center bureaucrats valued for professional, personal, and political rea-
sons. The potential size of the bonus award varied by state and program 
year. In program year 1986, for example, the total bonus was about 7 
percent of the training budget. These awards, however, could have been 
a substantial added source of training funds. Depending on the state and 
the year, this amounted to as much as 60 percent of a training center’s 
yearly allocation of funds.
The heart of the JTPA incentive system was the set of perfor-
mance measures and their standards. Job training programs illustrate 
the diffi culty of devising performance measures that are aligned with 
programmatic goals. In the early years of JTPA, performance measures 
were based on employment outcomes measured at training end, thus 
possibly encouraging training centers to pursue high employment rates 
instead of increased earnings-capacities. Moreover, because they were 
based on average outcomes, performance measures may have reduced 
the number of disadvantaged people served, raised the expenditure per 
enrollee, and produced budget surpluses. In later years, some states 
adopted expenditure-based performance measures, possibly to counter-
act the incentives created by federal measures to leave some of their 
budgets unspent.
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Training centers received awards when the outcomes of perfor-
mance measures exceeded numerical standards. The USDOL attempted 
to adjust performance standards to refl ect the environment in which 
the training center operated so that training centers in healthy and in 
depressed economies had to exert complementary levels of effort to 
achieve their standards. The USDOL’s adjustment scheme offers a real-
world example of strategies for adjusting performance measures that 
have been proposed in the literature (Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz 
1999). Performance standards were also adjusted for the characteris-
tics of persons enrolled, so as to discourage cream skimming, but not 
adjusted for the kinds of training offered. Excluding training from the 
adjustment method may have promoted employment-oriented services
—such as job clubs and on-the-job training—and these services may 
not have produced either stable employment relationships or signifi cant 
improvements in the long-term employability of enrollees. This study 
has revealed numerous ways in which performance measures might 
have been misaligned with the agency’s goals. With the exception of 
some cream skimming studies and a study of deadline effects, these 
distortionary effects have not been investigated. We believe that further 
research on the behavioral responses to JTPA’s incentives would lead 
to much useful information for developing and refi ning performance 
measures for many kinds of public sector organizations.
The federal government left the formulation of many of the details 
of the award to the states. Consequently, the form of the award varied. 
States established eligibility criteria that modifi ed the JTPA incentive 
system by reducing the incentive to specialize in the production of one 
or two performance measures, lowering the training center’s likelihood 
of obtaining an award, holding effort constant, and emphasizing some 
performance measures over others. 
The strength of the award varied greatly across states, suggesting 
that the magnitude of responses to performance incentives depended 
on the state. States also differed in the degree of competition among 
training centers and in the interdependence of awards. Head-to-head 
competition among training centers in some states may have heightened 
the impact of the incentive system on behavior. States also differed in 
the extent to which they compensated exceptional performance. In 
some states, training centers received no more award money for meet-
ing standards than exceeding them. In other states, training centers 
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received additional money for higher performance. States also designed 
and implemented their own performance measures that promoted dif-
ferent goals than the goals implicit in the federal measures. Thus, the 
objectives transmitted to the training center depended on the state in 
which it operated.
Notes
This chapter introduces features of the JTPA incentive system that will be used 
extensively in the remainder of this monograph. Some of these features have been dis-
cussed and analyzed in detail elsewhere (Courty and Marschke 1997, 2002, 2003, and 
2004), and parts of this chapter borrow from these sources.
1. Discussions of general criteria for choosing performance measures and construct-
ing performance measurement systems, for example, are found in Hatry (1980), 
Hurst (1980), Usilaner and Soniat (1980), Wholey (1999), and GAO (1996).
2. Cragg (1997) and Marschke (2002) are exceptions.
3. We chose to limit the number of states and years for which we collected incen-
tive policies because of the diffi culty and expense of obtaining these records. We 
collected data on these 16 states because they contained the training agencies that 
participated in the late 1980s USDOL-commissioned National JTPA Study, de-
scribed in Chapter 2.
4. The JTPA funds were allocated in three subfunds: 1) 78 percent were set aside for 
training services, 2) 6 percent were set aside for the incentive system, and 3) the 
remaining 16 percent were set aside for other special services. The award fund as a 
fraction of total training budget was 7.1 percent (6/[78+6]) if one assumes that all 
award funds were eventually distributed as training budget. The actual fi gure may 
have been a little lower because some of the incentive set aside fund was spent on 
the administration of the incentive funds. 
5. These fi gures are based on the data set of SRI, International and Berkeley Plan-
ning Associates. See Dickinson et al. (1988) for a description of these data.
6. Salary payroll represented at most 15 percent of training budget that was itself 
only 78 percent of total JTPA training funds (see Note 7). The award fund was 6 
percent of JTPA funds and at most 30 percent could be distributed as salary. The 
award salary bonus as a fraction of total salary was at most (0.06 × 0.3)/(0.15 × 
0.78) = 0.15.
7. In a survey of 30 training centers conducted by Dickinson et al. (1988), only 
three administrators indicated that this was their practice. In a 1994 telephone 
survey administered to 11 of the 16 training centers of the National JTPA Study, 
all training center administrators that we spoke to denied that they ever distributed 
a portion of the award for salary bonuses. 
8. Thompson (2000) describes the merit pay system at the Social Security Admin-
istration, ushered in with the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 
Under this system one half of managers’ annual pay increases were determined by 
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their performance relative to a set of output indicators. While originally set up as 
a basis for rewarding pay increases, these indicators became the basis for promo-
tion decisions as well. According to one former manager, they became “the basis 
for your career . . . if you do well on those four measures. You can write your own 
ticket” (p. 270).
9. Note that persons who entered the program already employed, and then terminated 
employed, holding the same job they began training with, say, were numbered 
among the successfully trained—i.e., were employed at termination—for award 
accounting purposes.
10. In the fi rst years of JTPA (through 1987), the USDOL required states to use a 
cost measure. Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts, alarmed at the short 
length of training (the average length of training is about fi ve months in JTPA), 
instigated investigations by the GAO and other interested parties into the link 
between cost measures and short, low-intensity services. As a consequence of this 
inquiry, the USDOL encouraged states to phase out the cost measure, “to encour-
age [training centers] to provide more comprehensive programming and increased 
services for those individuals who are most in need’’ (Division of Employment 
and Training, New Jersey Department of Labor 1990). Moreover, in response to 
a number of Labor Department investigations, which concluded that training cen-
ters were emphasizing “quick fi xes” with job-placement-oriented services that had 
no long-term impact on enrollees’ skills, the department formulated a number of 
follow-up measures: the measures based on outcomes three months after termi-
nation, presented in Table 4.3. The USDOL introduced follow-up measures to 
“[promote] effective service to participants and [assist] them to achieve long-term 
economic independence’’ (Division of Employment and Training, New Jersey De-
partment of Labor 1990). 
11. That is, the employment rate at termination and average wage at termination gave 
way to the employment rate, the average weeks worked, and average weekly earn-
ings at follow-up (13 weeks after termination).
12. Actually, the USDOL’s JTPA Technical Assistance Guide, PY1988, reports that 
the cost standard’s departure point was set “above the 25th percentile. It more 
closely resembles an estimate of average performance.” We interpret this state-
ment to mean the department set the wage standard at the 50th percentile.
13. State governors had the option to 1) set the performance standard at the national 
departure point; 2) adjust the national departure point for specifi c economic, geo-
graphic, and demographic factors within the state or local service delivery areas 
using the regression model established by the USDOL; or 3) propose their own 
adjustment method to the USDOL. Between the end of the National JTPA Study 
and the end of JTPA, more states abandoned the USDOL adjustment method for 
their own (option 3).
14. Barnow (1992) writes that “when estimated coeffi cients have an unexpected sign, 
the variables are dropped from the models and regressions are re-estimated” (p. 
292). For example, in some regressions, the USDOL dropped an indicator variable 
for Hispanic enrollees because it apparently showed a positive effect on perfor-
mance outcomes.
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15. For more on the specifi cation of USDOL’s regression model, see Barnow (1992) 
and Trott and Baj (1987). One signifi cant shortcoming they describe is that esti-
mating the Equation with training center–level data, as opposed to enrollee-level 
data, biased the estimates of the model’s coeffi cients. Using enrollee-level data, 
Trott and Baj demonstrated that the practice of pooling the data by training center 
signifi cantly changes some of the estimates of βm. For a general discussion of the 
theory of adjusting performance measures, what factors should and should not 
be used to adjust performance measures, see Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz 
(1999).
16. These states were California, Iowa, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, and Ohio.
17. These states were Georgia, Iowa, and Ohio.
18. The fi rst group consisted of the adult employment rate at termination and the adult 
cost per employment. The second group consisted of the youth positive termina-
tion rate and the youth employment rate at termination. The third group consisted 
of the average wage at termination, the welfare employment rate at termination, 
and the youth cost per positive termination. 
19. The USDOL’s performance standard adjustment methodology—to the extent that 
it accounted for external factors that affect performance—produced the same 
effect.
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